DELL BLUNDER
Dell installed a self-signed root certificate and
corresponding private key on its customers’ computers, apparently without
realizing that this exposes users’ encrypted communications to potential spying,
in an attempt to streamline remote support.
Even more surprising is that the company did this while being
fully aware of a very similar security blunder by one of its
competitors, Lenovo, that came to light in February,2015. This incident surely
raises questions on Dell’s Research and Development team.
In Lenovo’s case it was an advertising program called Superfish
that came preinstalled on some of the company’s consumer laptops and which
installed a self-signed root certificate. In Dell’s case it was one of the
company’s own support tools, which is arguably even worse because Dell bears
full responsibility for the decision.
Dell actually took advantage of Lenovo’s mishap to
highlight its own commitment to privacy and to advertise its products. The
product pages for Dell’s Inspiron 20 and XPS 27 All-in-One desktops, Inspiron
14 5000 Series, Inspiron 15 7000 Series, Inspiron 17 7000 Series laptops and
probably other products, read: “Worried about Superfish? Dell limits its
pre-loaded software to a small number of high-value applications on all of our
computers. Each application we pre-load undergoes security, privacy and
usability testing to ensure that our customers experience the best possible
computing performance, faster set-up and reduced privacy and security
concerns.”
Why should you care
The eDellRoot self-signed certificate is installed in the
Windows certificate store under the “Trusted Root Certification Authorities.”
This means that any SSL/TLS or code-signing certificate that is signed with the
eDellRoot certificate’s private key will be trusted by browsers, desktop email
clients and other applications that run on affected Dell systems.
For example, attackers can use the eDellRoot private key, which
is now publicly available online, to generate certificates for any
HTTPS-enabled websites. They can then use public wireless networks or hacked
routers to decrypt traffic from affected Dell systems to those websites.
In these so-called Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks, the
attackers intercept users’ HTTPS requests to a secure website- lets say axisbank.com for example. They then start acting as a proxy by establishing a legitimate
connection to the real website from their own machine and passing the traffic
back to the victims after re-encrypting it with a rogue axisbank.com
certificate generated with the eDellRoot key.
The users will see a valid HTTPS-encrypted connection to Bank of
America in their browsers, but the attackers will actually be able to read and
modify their traffic.
Attackers could also use the eDellRoot private key to generate
certificates that could be used to sign malware files. Those files would
generate less scary User Account Control prompts on affected Dell systems when
executed, because they would appear to the OS as if they were signed by a
trusted software publisher. Malicious system drivers signed with such a rogue
certificate would also bypass the driver signature verification in 64-bit
versions of Windows.
It’s not just laptops
Initial reports were about finding the eDellRoot certificate on
various Dell laptop models. However, the certificate is actually installed by
the Dell Foundation Services (DFS) application which, according to its release notes, is available on laptops, desktops,
all-in-ones, two-in-ones, and towers from various Dell product lines, including
XPS, OptiPlex, Inspiron, Vostro and Precision Tower.
Dell said Monday that it began loading the current version of
this tool on “consumer and commercial devices” in August. This may refer
both to devices sold since August as well as those sold prior and which
received an updated version of the DFS tool. The certificate has been found on
at least one older machine in PCWorld's possession: a Dell Venue Pro 11 tablet
dating from April.
More than one certificate
Researchers from security firm Duo Security found a second eDellRoot certificate with a different
fingerprint on 24 systems scattered around the world. Most surprisingly, one of
those systems appears to be part of a SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition) set-up, like those used to control industrial processes.
Other users also reported the presence of another certificate called
DSDTestProvider on some Dell computers. Some people have speculated
that this is related to the Dell System Detect utility, although this is not
yet confirmed.Well, time to feel some pressure Dell..
There’s a removal tool available
Dell released a removal tool and also published manual removal instructions for the
eDellRoot certificate. However, the instructions might prove too difficult for
a user with no technical knowledge to follow. The company also plans to push a software update that
will search for the certificate and remove it from systems automatically. If that's done so then it will be a big sigh of relief for DELL.
Who are on target list?
Well, Its likely Roaming corporate users, especially traveling executives, could
be the most attractive targets for man-in-the-middle attackers exploiting this
flaw, because they likely have valuable information on their computers.Well thats a matter of common sense, Hacker would like to steal information which is meaningful, confidential and precious. Of course I'm not in the target list. ;-)
Robert Graham,CEO of Errata had a remarkable statement on this in a blog post-“If I were a black-hat hacker, I’d immediately go to the nearest
big city airport and sit outside the international first class lounges and
eavesdrop on everyone’s encrypted communications.”
As a matter of course, companies should deploy their own, clean
and pre-configured Windows images on the laptops they buy. They should also
make sure that their roaming employees are always connecting back to corporate
offices over secure virtual private networks (VPNs).
It’s not just Dell computer owners who should care
The implications of this security hole reach beyond just owners
of Dell systems. In addition to stealing information, including log-in credentials,
from encrypted traffic, man-in-the-middle attackers can also modify that
traffic on the fly. This means someone receiving an email from an affected Dell
computer or a website receiving a request on behalf of a Dell user can’t be
sure of its authenticity.How cool is that!!!!;-)
- ASHISH CHHATANI
very nice..
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